Criminal cases and statutes

Criminal law cases and statutes

General elements of liability

Non-fatal offences

Fatal offences

Property offences

Theft
Robbery
Burglary

Preliminary offences

Attempt

Defences

Insanity
Intoxication
Automatism
Self-defence
Duress
Duress of circumstances
Consent

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Actus reus and causation

Hill v Baxter (1958)

The defendant drove a long distance while part-conscious. He was charged with dangerous driving.

Held: D was liable for his crime because he was conscious enough to be controlling the vehicle so the actus reus was voluntary. The judge gave examples of when a driver would not be liable for driving offences, such as if a swarm of bees got into the vehicle and attacked the driver.

R v Mitchell (1983)

D punched a 72-year-old man during an argument in the queue at a Post Office. The elderly man staggered backwards and fell into an 89-year-old woman. The woman was knocked over and later died of her injuries.

Held: D was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter. The 72-year-old man was not convicted of any offence, as his act was involuntary.

R v Larsonneur (1933)

D was a French national who was ordered to leave the UK. She travelled to the Republic of Ireland, but Irish police detained her immediately on arrival in Ireland and forced her to return to the UK. When she arrived back in the UK, she was charged under the Aliens Order 1920, which dealt with illegal immigration.

Held: D was convicted, despite her presence in the UK being involuntary because the crime was one of absolute liability.

R v Pagett (1983)

D used his girlfriend as a human shield during a confrontation with armed police. Whilst holding his girlfriend in front of him, D shot at police officers. They returned fire and police bullets killed D’s girlfriend. D was prosecuted for manslaughter.

Held: D’s actions were the factual cause of his girlfriend’s death, because but for D holding her and shooting at the police, she would not have died.

The police shooting back at Pagett was a foreseeable reaction by a third party. Therefore, the act of the third party (the police) did not break the chain of causation.

R v White (1910)

D put poison into his mother’s evening drink, intending to kill her. She drank a few sips and fell asleep. She died in her sleep, but medical evidence said that she died from a heart attack and not from poisoning. D was prosecuted on a charge of murder.

Held: D was not liable for murder. The heart attack meant that, but for D putting poison in the drink, his mother would have died anyway. His actions were not the factual cause of her death.

R v Hughes (2013)

D was not insured and did not have a full driving licence. He was driving his camper van faultlessly along a road (on his side of the road and was within the speed limit). As he rounded a bend, a car came onto his side of the road and hit the camper van. The driver of the other car was under the influence of heroin and died as a result of the accident. D was prosecuted for causing death by driving without a licence. At trial, he was convicted.

Held: The Supreme Court overturned his conviction. While D driving without a licence satisfied the ‘but for’ test in relation to V’s death, it was not enough to be a ‘legally effective cause’.

“Where there are multiple legally effective causes, it suffices if the act or omission under consideration is a significant (or substantial) cause, in the sense that it is not de minimis or minimal. It need not be the only or the principal cause. It must, however, be a cause which is more than de minimis, more than minimal.”

R v Kimsey (1996)

D lost control of her car while racing her friend at high speed. She lost control of her car and the other driver was killed. At trial, the judge directed the jury that D’s conduct did not have to be ‘the principle, or a substantial cause of the death, as long as you are sure that it was a cause and that there must be something more than a slight or trifling link’. D was convicted of death by dangerous driving.

Held: The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and the judge’s direction to the jury.

R v Blaue (1975)

D stabbed the victim. V was told she needed a blood transfusion to save her life. She refused on religious grounds, based on the teaching of Jehovah’s Witnesses against blood transfusions. V died as a result. D was charged with manslaughter.

Held: While V’s faith made the harm fatal, the defendant must ‘take his victim as he finds them’. The ‘thin-skull’ rule applied and D was convicted.

R v Roberts (1972)

D was a man driving home a young woman from a party. The victim rejected a sexual advance from Roberts, who continued to touch her. V leapt from the car while it was travelling at between 20 and 40mph. She suffered injuries and D was charged under s 47 (ABH).

Held: The Court of Appeal described the test as ‘was V’s reaction the natural result of what D said and did, in the sense that it was something that could reasonably have been foreseen as the consequence of what D was saying or doing?’ D was liable for V’s injuries. Her leaping from the car did not break the chain of causation.

R v Williams and Davis (1992)

V was a hitch-hiker who believed Williams and Davis were trying to steal his wallet. As a result, V jumped from the car while it was travelling at 30mph. He died from head injuries.

Held: The Court of Appeal asked whether V’s conduct was ‘within the ambit of reasonableness and not so daft as to make his own voluntary act one which amounted to a novus actus interveniens (a new intervening act) and consequently broke the chain of causation. Williams and Davis were not liable for the man’s death’.

R v Smith (1959)

D stabbed V in the lung. The stretcher carrying V was dropped, and then V was given CPR, which made the injury much worse and decreased V’s chance of survival by around 75%. V died. D was charged with murder.

Held: The poor medical treatment, even though it was extremely poor, did not break the chain of causation. D’s act (stabbing V) was still an operating and substantial cause of V’s death.

R v Cheshire (1991)

D shot V twice. During surgery, doctors gave V a tracheotomy. Two months later, V died from complications due to the tracheotomy. At the time of death, V’s gunshot wounds had almost completely healed and were no longer life-threatening. D was charged with murder.

Held: D was liable for V’s murder. It didn’t matter that the doctors’ treatment ‘fell short of the standard expected of a competent medical practitioner’. D shooting V was still a significant contributing factor to V’s death.

R v Jordan (1956)

D stabbed V. While in hospital, V was given an antibiotic to which he suffered an allergic reaction. One doctor stopped the use of the antibiotic, but another doctor failed to read the notes and administered a large dose of the same drug. V died from an allergic reaction.

Held: D was not liable for V’s death. The doctor’s actions were held to be an intervening act causing the death. The administration of the antibiotic was sufficiently independent and sufficiently serious to break the chain of causation.

R v Malcherek (1981)

D stabbed V (his wife). V was placed on life support. After tests revealed she was brain dead, doctors switched off the life support.

Held: The trial judge refused to allow issues of causation to be put to the jury by the defence, and this was upheld by the Court of Appeal. D was convicted. Doctors switching off life support did not break the chain of causation.

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Omissions as actus reus

s 170 Road Traffic Act 1988

(1) This section applies in a case where, owing to the presence of a vehicle on a road, an accident occurs.

(2) The driver of the vehicle must stop and, if required to do so by any person having reasonable grounds for so requiring, give his name and address and also the name and address of the owner and the identification marks of the vehicle.”

R v Pittwood (1902)

D was a railway crossing keeper who failed to shut the gates, leading to someone being hit and killed by a train.

Held: D was convicted of manslaughter. His failure (omission) to shut the gates was enough for criminal liability because of his contractual duty to do so.

R v Gibbins and Proctor (1918)

D1 was the father of a 7-year-old girl and D2 was his partner. They kept the girl away from her half-siblings and deliberately starved her to death.

Held: Both were convicted of murder. Their failure (omission) to feed the child was enough to create criminal liability, because they had a duty as parents to feed their child.

R v Stone and Dobinson (1977)

Stone and Dobinson allowed Stone’s elderly sister to live with them. She became more frail, and eventually depended on them to feed her. They failed to do so and she died from malnutrition.

Held: Both were convicted of manslaughter. While Stone had a duty as a brother, Dobinson had voluntarily taken on a duty to care for the victim.

R v Evans (2007)

Evans provided her 16-year-old half-sister with heroin, to which she was addicted. V self-injected the heroin. Evans knew that V had overdosed but did not seek medical help. V died.

Held: Evans was convicted of gross negligence manslaughter. She had voluntarily taken on a duty to her half-sister when she provided the heroin.

R v Dytham (1979)

Dytham was a police officer on duty who witnessed a fight in which one man was kicked to death. He did not intervene or summon help, instead leaving the scene to go off duty.

Held: Dytham was convicted of misconduct in public office. He had a duty to intervene or summon help that came from his official position as a police officer on duty.

R v Miller (1983)

Miller fell asleep while smoking a cigarette in a flat in which he was squatting. He woke up to find his mattress on fire. He did not attempt to put out the fire and did not call for help, instead going into another room and going back to sleep.

Held: Miller was convicted of arson. The arson did not occur when the fire started, but when Miller noticed the fire and failed to call for help.

DPP v Santa-Bermudez (2003)

D told a police officer before he was searched that he did not have any needles in his pockets. The officer was then injured by a needle in D’s pocket.

Held: D was convicted of s 47 ABH for his failure to tell the police officer about the needle.

Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (1993)

Bland had been in a persistent vegetative state for 3 years after being crushed in the Hillsborough stadium disaster. Doctors asked the court to rule on whether withdrawing treatment could make them criminally liable for Bland’s death.

Held: Doctors removing food or life support in the best interests of a patient is not an omission that creates criminal liability.

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Mens rea

R v Mohan (1975)

A police officer stood in the road and signalled for D to stop his car. D slowed down, but (when about ten yards from the officer) he accelerated and drove at the officer. The officer jumped out of the way to avoid being injured. D was charged with attempted GBH, which requires intent to be proven.

Held: Intention is defined as ‘a decision to bring about, in so far as it lies within the accused’s power, [the prohibited consequence], no matter whether the accused desired that consequence of his act or not.’

s 8 Criminal Justice Act 1967

A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence,—

(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions; but

(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances.

R v Woollin (1998)

D threw his 3-month-old baby into his pram from a distance of several feet. The pram was against a wall. The baby hit the wall, suffered head injuries and died. D was found guilty at trial and appealed to the House of Lords.

Held: ‘The jury should be directed that they are not entitled to find the necessary intention unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant’s actions and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case.’

R v Matthews and Alleyne (2003)

Ds threw V from a bridge into a deep river. V had told Ds that he could not swim. Ds watched V attempt to get to the bank, but left before they saw whether he had made it. V drowned.

Held: The Court of Appeal held that the Woollin decision does not mean that foresight of consequences is the same as intention. Instead, they said foresight of consequences is a rule of evidence – it is evidence from which intention may be found.

Met Police Commissioner v Caldwell (1982)

D worked in a hotel and held a grudge against his employer. D got very drunk and started a fire in the hotel at a time when ten people were staying in it. The fire was quickly extinguished. D was charged under the Criminal Damage Act 1971 with aggravated criminal damage with intention or recklessness as to the endangerment of life. D claimed that he was so drunk he did not realise there was a risk of endangering life.

Held: D was convicted and his conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal. The courts accepted that D did not realise there was a risk, but said there was an obvious risk of death that meant his conduct could still be considered reckless. This introduced a form of objective recklessness (or Caldwell recklessness) into law.

Elliott v C (1983)

D was a 14-year-old girl with learning difficulties. She spilled some flammable materials on the floor of a shed and dropped a lighted match onto the floor. The shed caught fire. Magistrates took the decision in Caldwell to mean that an ‘obvious risk’ means obvious to the defendant at the time. D was acquitted.

Held: On appeal, the decision was overturned and D was convicted of reckless arson. The Court of Appeal held that recklessness includes circumstances when the risk is obvious to a ‘reasonably prudent man’. The fact that D did not know the risk was held to be irrelevant.

R v G (2003)

D1 and D2 were two boys, aged 11 and 12. They set fire to piles of newspapers behind a shop. They threw the newspapers under a bin, assuming the fire would go out on its own. In fact, the fire spread to the shop and neighbouring buildings, causing £1 million worth of damage. The pair were convicted of reckless criminal damage and the conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

Held: the House of Lords overturned the conviction and overturned the ruling in Caldwell. They said that the Caldwell ruling had pushed the definition of recklessness ‘beyond the range of feasible meanings’. This means that objective recklessness no longer exists – recklessness is always tested subjectively.

R v Cunningham (1957)

D was trying to steal money from a gas meter attached to an empty house. D tore the gas meter from the wall, which then caused poisonous gas to get into a nearby house, harming a woman in the property. D was charged under s 23 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 with maliciously administering a noxious thing.

Held: D was found not guilty because he did not know there was a risk of gas escaping from the meter. There was no subjective recklessness, so there was no liability.

R v Savage (1992)

D was trying to throw beer over her husband’s ex-girlfriend. The glass slipped from her hand, smashed and cut V’s wrist. D was charged under s 20 OAPA (maliciously wounding) At trial, the judge directed the jury that ‘maliciously wounding’ meant deliberately wounding and the jury acquitted D.

Held: The Court of Appeal held that ‘maliciously’ means recklessly wherever it appears in statute and that recklessness is tested subjectively. The Court of Appeal substituted the conviction for one of ABH under s 47 OAPA.

R v Latimer (1886)

D was fighting with another man in a pub. He tried to hit the other man with his belt, but the belt only grazed his intended victim and instead hit a nearby woman with some force. The woman was seriously injured. D was charged under s 20 OAPA 1861.

Held: the defendant’s intention or recklessness as to causing harm to his intended victim was enough to convict him for the actual harm caused to someone else. The malice is transferred between the intended victim and the actual victim.

R v Pembliton (1874)

D was involved in a fight outside of a pub. He picked up a stone and threw it at those he was fighting with, but the stone missed them all and instead broke a nearby window.

Held: the defendant’s intention or recklessness as to harming the other people could not be transferred to the window because it is an entirely different type of offence (i.e. a property offence, rather than an offence against the person).

R v Gnango (2011)

D and another man engaged in a shoot-out, shooting at each other. The other man hit an innocent bystander and killed her. The Court of Appeal quashed D’s conviction for murder.

Held: the Supreme Court reinstated the conviction. They held that D had been attempting to murder the other man and had been aiding and abetting the other man in the attempted murder of himself. They transferred this malice to the actual victim and convicted D of murder.

Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3 of 1994) (1997)

D stabbed his pregnant girlfriend, who then gave birth to a child. The child was wounded in the incident and died 121 days after birth. D was charged with murder but acquitted on the basis that his intent could not be transferred to an unborn child.

Held: the House of Lords held that the mens rea for murder could not be transferred to the unborn child. But they held that D had committed unlawful act manslaughter against the child.

Thabo Meli v R (1954)

Four defendants planned to kill their victim. They beat him over the head and, believing him to be dead, pushed him over a cliff edge. V then died of exposure and not from the head injuries. Ds were convicted and then appealed on the basis that actus reus and mens rea didn’t coincide.

Held: The appeal was rejected. The House of Lords said it was ‘impossible to divide up what was really one transaction’. The defendant’s actions combined into a series of acts, meaning actus reus and mens rea did coincide.

R v Church (1966)

D and V were in a van when they began to fight. D knocked V out and spent 30 minutes trying and failing to revive her. Believing V was dead, D threw her into the river. V’s body was found and the cause of death was drowning.

Held: D was convicted of manslaughter and the conviction was upheld on appeal. The mens rea (recklessness) was present throughout a series of acts.

Fagan v Met Police Commissioner (1986)

D was told to park his car by a police officer. He accidentally stopped the car with a wheel on top of the officer’s foot. The officer told D what had happened and told him to move the car. D refused and swore at the officer instead. D was convicted of assault and appealed on the basis that the contemporaneity rule was not met.

Held: D’s conviction was upheld. While an omission cannot create liability for an assault, the Court of Appeal held that driving onto the foot and keeping it there was a continuing act. The assault was not committed when D stopped the car, but when he continued to keep it on the officer’s foot. At this point, both actus reus and mens rea were present at the same time.

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Strict liability

Pharmaceutical Society of GB v Storkwain Ltd (1986)

D was a pharmacist who supplied prescription drugs based on prescriptions that later turned out to be very good forgeries. There was no evidence that D had known the prescriptions were forged. D was charged under s 58(2) Medicines act 1968, which makes it an offence to supply drugs without a doctor’s prescription.

Held: D was convicted and his conviction was upheld by the House of Lords. D had supplied drugs without a doctor’s prescription, even though he didn’t know the prescriptions were fake.

R v Prince (1875)

s 55 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 made it an offence to take an unmarried girl under the age of 16 ‘out of the possession and against the will of her father or mother’. D ‘took’ a girl he reasonably believed to be 14 ‘out of the possession’ of her father. He knew the girl was in her father’s possession, but believed her to be 18 years old. D was charged under s 55 OAPA.

Held: D was convicted. Mens rea was required for taking a girl ‘out of the possession’ of her parents (and D had this mens rea) but no mens rea was required for the age element of the offence.

R v Larsonneur (1933)

Held: D was convicted, despite her presence in the UK being involuntary because the crime was one of absolute liability.

Winzar v Chief Constable of Kent (1983)

D was taken to hospital, where doctors decided he was drunk and not ill. He was then found asleep in a chair at the hospital. Staff called the police, who then took D to the side of the road outside the hospital. There, police put him in their car and drove him to the police station, charging him with being ‘found drunk in any highway or other public place’ under s 12 Licensing Act 1872.

Held: D was convicted and his conviction was upheld on appeal.

Callow v Tillstone (1900)

Callow was a butcher. He asked a vet to examine an animal carcass to determine if it was fit for human consumption. The vet told him that it was, so Callow butchered the carcass and sold it to customers. The meat was found to be unfit to eat and Callow was charged with ‘exposing unsound meat for sale’.

Held: Callow was convicted. Despite having no fault and having taken due diligence to avoid selling unsound meat, the offence was one of strict liability.

Harrow LBC v Shah and Shah (1999)

D1 and D2 owned a newsagent. They had told their staff, with regular reminders, not to sell lottery tickets to people under 16. Ds told staff that, if there was any doubt, staff should refer the matter to them. One day, when D1 was in the back room and D2 was off the premises, one of their staff members sold a lottery ticket to a 13-year-old boy. Ds were charged under s 13(1)(c) National Lottery Act 1993.

Held: Shah and Shah were acquitted by magistrates, but the prosecution appealed and the pair were convicted.

Cundy v Le Cocq (1884)

D was charged with selling alcohol to a drunk person. The court accepted that the man had not behaved in any way that indicated he was drunk and that there was no reason the bar staff would have thought him to be drunk.

Held: D was convicted and the conviction was upheld on appeal. The fact that D had made an honest mistake was no defence, as the offence was one of strict liability.

Sweet v Parsley (1969)

D rented a house out to students. Cannabis was found in the house, though D didn’t know it was there. D was charged with ‘being concerned in the management of premises used for the purpose of smoking cannabis resin’.

Held: The courts always presume that an offence does need a mens rea (they presume the offence isn’t strict liability, unless there are good reasons to make it strict liability. “There has for centuries been a presumption that Parliament did not intend to make criminals of persons who were in no way blameworthy in what they did. That means that whenever a section is silent as to mens rea there is a presumption that… we must read in words appropriate to require mens rea.”

Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney-General of Hong Kong (1984)

Project managers for some building works in Hong Kong were charged with deviating from approved building plans in a way likely to cause risk of injury to any person or damage to any property, contrary to Hong Kong building regulations. A magistrate acquitted the defendants on the grounds that they didn’t know of the deviations.

Held: following Sweet v Parsley, the Privy Council agreed there is a presumption of mens rea, but laid out four factors that might allow this presumption to be displaced when interpreting statutes:

It is the clear meaning of the statute
The offence is not ‘truly criminal’ in character
The statute concerns an issue of social concern
Making the offence strict liability will help enforcement of the law

National Lottery Act 1993

13 Contravention of regulations an offence.

If any requirement or restriction imposed by regulations made under section 12 is contravened in relation to the promotion of a lottery that forms part of the National Lottery—

(a) the promoter of the lottery shall be guilty of an offence, except if the contravention occurred without the consent or connivance of the promoter and the promoter exercised all due diligence to prevent such a contravention,

Point of law: The offence in s 13(1)(c) is strict liability, because the earlier subsections mention mens rea – e.g. ‘consent’, ‘connivance’ – but (c) doesn’t. This is the offence that Shah and Shah were prosecuted for in Harrow v Shah and Shah.

B v DPP (2000)

D was a 15-year-old boy who asked a 13-year-old girl to have sex with him. D believed the girl was 14, but was charged with inciting a child under 14 to commit an act of gross indecency.

Held: D’s conviction was quashed by the House of Lords. Lord Nicholls said, “The more serious the offence, the greater was the weight to be attached to the presumption of mens rea, because the more severe was the punishment and the graver the stigma that accompanied a conviction.”

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Assault

R v Constanza (1997)

D made numerous silent phone calls to an ex-colleague, wrote her hundreds of letters and repeatedly visited her house without invitation. He then sent two letters including threatening language. D never touched V. The victim was diagnosed with depression and anxiety as a result.

Held: the string of silent phone calls and threatening letters were enough for the actus reus of assault. Words alone are enough for an assault.

R v Ireland (1997)

D made silent phone calls to three separate women. He never spoke on the phone but breathed heavily down the line. All three suffered psychiatric harm as a result. D was convicted but appealed on the basis that an omission cannot create liability for assault and he had not spoken during the calls.

Held: D’s conviction was upheld, because D had acted in making the calls and D “intends his silence to cause fear and intimidation” (Lord Steyn).

R v Lamb (1967)

D was joking with his friend by pointing a gun at him that he believed was not loaded in a way that a bullet could fire. His friend played along, also believing the gun was not dangerous. D accidentally fired the gun and a bullet unexpectedly fired and killed V. D was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter (with assault as the unlawful act) and appealed.

Held: D’s conviction was overturned as no assault had taken place. V did not apprehend the infliction of immediate, unlawful force because he did not believe the gun to be loaded.

Smith v Chief Superintendent of Woking (1983)

D entered an enclosed garden at V’s house at 11pm. He looked through V’s bedroom window. When V saw D, she jumped and screamed through fear. She called the police.

Held: D was liable for assault, even though he couldn’t have inflicted instantaneous force. ‘Immediate’ force in the actus reus of assault simply means V fears violence “at some time not excluding the immediate future” [R v Lamb]

Tuberville v Savage (1669)

Savage had insulted Tuberville. Tuberville grabbed the handle of his sword and told Savage, “If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you.” Assize-time refers to the period visit of law courts to the area. Tuberville argued that he had not assaulted Savage because he explicitly told him that he wouldn’t attack due to the assizes.

Held: there was no assault. Tuberville’s conduct, in conjunction with his words, was not enough to make Savage fear immediate force.

R v Light (1857)

D raised a sword above his wife’s head and told her, “Were it not for the bloody policeman outside, I would split your head open.” D claimed that the precedent from Tuberville v Savage meant there was not assault.

Held: there was an assault. The court distinguished between the facts of the two cases, saying that raising the sword above his wife’s head was so threatening that his words did not stop it being an assault.

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Battery

Collins v Wilcock (1984)

A police officer suspected that a woman, previously unknown to the police, was soliciting as a prostitute. When the officer asked her name, she refused and walked away. When she did the same again, the officer held her by the arm in order to prevent her from walking away. The woman swore at the officer and scratched his arm. She was charged with assaulting a police officer in the line of duty. She appealed on the basis that the officer was not acting in the line of his duty; he was acting unlawfully by taking her arm.

Held: The appeal was upheld. Even though the officer hadn’t been particularly forceful, taking hold of her arm was enough to be ‘force’ for the actus reus of battery. The court also ruled that battery depends on contact that goes beyond “generally acceptable standards of conduct”.

Marland v DPP (2023)

D thought his partner was drunk and needed to be taken home. He grabbed her by her shoulders and took her to the car, despite her making it clear that she did not want to go. D argued that, thinking she was drunk, he thought he was keeping his partner safe by taking her home. However, in taking her to the car against her will, his partner fell to the ground.

Held: D was liable for battery. “It would be contrary to public policy to hold that it is acceptable for a man, knowing that a woman did not consent to being touched, to say that he knew she was not consenting but he did what he did because he thought it was in her best interests.”

R v Thomas (1985)

Thomas was a school caretaker. For one of the counts, Thomas rubbed the bottom of the skirt of a student, without touching the student herself. He was charged with indecent assault, which requires there to be a technical battery that is indecent in nature.

Held: touching the victim’s skirt was enough to constitute a battery. The Court of Appeal held that, “There could be no dispute that if you touch a person’s clothes while he is wearing them that is equivalent to touching him.”

Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1968)

The driver refused to move his car off the foot of the police officer after initially parking it on the officer’s foot accidentally.

Held: D committed the battery through a continuous act.

DPP v K (1990)

D was a 15-year-old boy. He took sulphuric acid from his science lesson without permission. He was planning to experiment with it, but heard footsteps and thought he was going to be caught. He panicked and hid the acid in the hand dryer. Before he could remove it, the dryer was used by another student, who was then sprayed with the acid. D was charged with s 47 ABH, on the basis of a battery that caused actual bodily harm. Magistrates acquitted D and the prosecution appealed.

Held: The appeal was successful. A battery can be committed even where the force between D and V is indirect.

DPP v Santa-Bermudez (2003)

D was being searched by a police officer, who asked him whether there were any sharp objects in his pockets. He said ‘no’. The officer was then cut during the search by a needle in the man’s pocket.

Held: D was convicted. An omission can create liability for battery.

DPP v Majewski (1976)

D drank a lot of alcohol and took drugs in a pub. When he was challenged by the landlord, he attacked the landlord. D then went on to attack the police officers who were called to the scene. D argued that he had been too intoxicated to know what he was doing. He was convicted of battery and appealed.

Held: The House of Lords upheld D’s conviction. They held that taking such large quantities of drugs and alcohol was reckless in itself, meaning D had met the mens rea requirements of assault and battery.

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s 47 ABH

s 47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861

Whosoever shall be convicted upon an indictment of any assault occasioning actual bodily harm shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude.

R v Miller (1954)

Miller and his wife were separated but not divorced. Miller forced his wife to have sex with him and was charged with rape and a 47 ABH. The court held that he could not be convicted of raping his wife, but the question of what constituted ABH remained.

Held: D was convicted of ABH. It was held that actual bodily harm means “any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of the victim”.

R v Chan Fook (1994)

D accused V of stealing an engagement ring. He hit the victim several times and locked him in a bedroom, causing both physical injuries and psychological suffering. However, the prosecution didn’t include the physical injuries in their case. The trial judge directed the jury that a “nervous and hysterical” condition could be enough for s 47 ABH and D was convicted.

Held: the Court of Appeal disagreed with the judge’s direction. It was held that “actual” has its usual meaning, which is “not so trivial as to be wholly insignificant”. The court also held that ABH “does not include mere emotions such as fear or distress nor panic nor does it include, as such, states of mind that are not themselves evidence of some identifiable clinical condition”.

T v DPP (2003)

D was part of a group of boys who approached V and began attacking him. When V fell over, D kicked him. Though V didn’t suffer any other injuries, he lost consciousness for a short time before being woken by a police officer. D was convicted at trial and appealed on the basis that he had not caused actual bodily harm.

Held: D’s conviction was upheld. The High Court held that losing consciousness for any amount of time amounts to ABH. The court also reaffirmed the decision in R v Chan Fook that “actual bodily harm” has its usual meaning and juries shouldn’t need any further direction on it.

DPP v Smith (Michael) (2006)

D was arguing with his girlfriend when he cut off her ponytail. He did not injure the victim in any other way. He was charged with s 47 ABH. Magistrates acquitted D, on the basis that cutting hair could not be considered ABH. The prosecution appealed.

Held: the appeal was successful. As hair is attached to the head, the court held that the ordinary meaning of “bodily” includes the hair and that cutting off a substantial amount of hair can constitute ABH. The court pointed out that only a substantial amount of hair would amount to ABH.

R v Roberts (1971)

D made sexual advances towards the passenger in his car and tried to remove her coat. V feared that D would continue to a more serious assault and jumped from the car as it travelled at 30 miles per hour. She was injured by her jump from the car. D argued that he had not intended or been subjectively reckless as to causing any injury.

Held: while D may not have realised the risk of injury, he intended to apply unlawful force when he touched her without consent. This satisfied the mens rea of s 47 ABH.

R v Savage (1991)

D threw beer over V in a pub, but the glass slipped from her hand and the glass cut V’s hand. D argued that she had not even been subjectively reckless as to causing harm. D was convicted of s 20 GBH, which was reduced to s 47 ABH by the Court of Appeal. D appealed to the House of Lords.

Held: the House of Lords rejected the appeal. They held that D had intended to subject V to unlawful force, and that this was enough for the mens rea of s 47.

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s 20 GBH

s 20 Offences Against the Person Act 1861

Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any grievous bodily harm upon any other person, either with or without any weapon or instrument, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and being convicted thereof shall be liable… to be kept in penal servitude

JJC v Eisenhower (1983)

D shot an air rifle towards a group of people. One of the pellets hit V in the face, causing blood vessels in her eye to rupture, with bruising around the eye but no cut on V’s face. The prosecution brought a charge under the “wounding” element of s 18 GBH (which has the same actus reus as s 20).

Held: D was found not guilty of wounding and the charge was reduced (on appeal) to one of actual bodily harm. The court held that “it is not enough that there has been a rupturing of a blood vessel or vessels internally for there to be a wound under the statute”.

CPS Charging Standards 2022

The severity of a wound is addressed in this approach: a wound requiring life-saving surgery would usually be charged contrary to section 20/18 whereas a more minor assault causing a minor cut would amount to a battery or ABH. Where a knife is used to wound, section 20/18 is almost always the appropriate charge.

Point of law: The wounding element of s 20 is rarely used on its own. If a minor wound is inflicted, it is usually charged as either battery or ABH. Wounds are only prosecuted under s 20 or s 18 if the wound is serious or is inflicted with a knife.

DPP v Smith (1961)

D was told by a police officer to stop his car, but D drove away instead. The officer jumped onto the car and was then thrown off it and killed when D swerved the car harshly. D was convicted of murder (which requires intent to cause GBH) and appealed on the basis that he did not intend to cause GBH.

Held: D’s conviction was reduced to manslaughter by the Court of Appeal. The court held that judges can direct juries that “grievous bodily harm” means “really serious harm”. This judgement has been upheld repeatedly since, including in R v Sidhu (2019).

R v Bollom (2004)

D was charged under s 20 for inflicting injuries on his partner’s 17-month-old child. The injuries consisted of bruising to the child’s abdomen, both arms and one leg. It was agreed at trial that the injuries were not, in themselves, really serious. But the judge directed the jury that they could take account of V’s age (or other vulnerabilities) in deciding whether the injuries were “really serious”. D was convicted under s 20 and appealed to have the conviction reduced to s 47 ABH.

Held: the Court of Appeal rejected the appeal, explaining that, “We have no doubt that in determining the gravity of these injuries, it was necessary to consider them in their real context.”

R v Dica (2004)

D had unprotected sex with two women. D knew that he had HIV, but didn’t tell this to either woman. Both women were infected with HIV. D was convicted under s 20 and appealed.

Held: the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and ordered a retrial, holding that the women consented to unprotected sex and had therefore knowingly taken the risk of infection. However, the court also held that infection with a serious illness could amount to grievous bodily harm.

R v Lewis (1974)

D shouted multiple threats at his wife through the locked door of a second-floor flat. He then tried to break down the door. His wife was afraid and jumped from the window of the flat, breaking both of her legs in the fall. D was charged under s 20.

Held: D was convicted. Despite not touching the victim, he “inflicted” the GBH by a technical assault that led to her suffering really serious harm.

R v Burstow (1997)

D harassed a woman over a period of several months, with whom he had previously had a short relationship. The harassment included abusive phone calls, hate mail and stalking. As a result, V suffered from serious depression. D was convicted under s 20 and appealed the House of Lords.

Held: the House of Lords affirmed two important points…

Psychiatric harm – if really serious – can amount to GBH
There does not have to be a technical assault or battery for D to be liable for “inflicting” GBH.

R v Parmenter (1991)

D threw his 3-month-old child into the air, seriously injuring the child. D argued that he did not realise the risk of any injury because he had done this with other children before. At trial, he was convicted under s 20 and appealed to the House of Lords.

Held: the House of Lords quashed the conviction and substituted one of s 47 ABH. The Lords held that, for s 20, the defendant simply had to realise the risk of some harm, which Parmenter had not.

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s 18 GBH

s 18 Offences Against the Person Act 1861

Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously by any means whatsoever wound or cause any grievous bodily harm to any person, with intent to do some grievous bodily harm to any person, or with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any person, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude for life.

R v Taylor (2009)

D was convicted under the wounding element of s 18 after scratching the victim with a fork and inflicting a minor stab wound to V’s back with a knife. The judge directed the jury, saying: If you are sure that an attack took place then you have to consider intention... You may think that if you found that the attack took place and that it was an attack with a knife, that finding an intention to cause a wound is not going to take you very long.’ D appealed on the basis that this was a misdirection.

Held: the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction. It was held that s 18 requires intent to cause GBH (or to prevent lawful arrest). Intent to wound is not enough.

R v Woollin (1998)

D threw his 3-month-old baby into his pram from a distance of a few feet. The pram was against a wall. The baby hit the wall, suffered head injuries and died. D was found guilty of murder at trial (which requires intent to kill or to cause GBH) and appealed to the House of Lords.

Held: intention can only be found if GBH was a ‘virtual certainty’ as a result of D’s actions and D knew that (or if D made a decision to bring about the GBH).

R v Morrison (1989)

A police officer entered a building to make an arrest, where she found the defendant hiding upstairs. The officer managed to grab the defendant’s clothes as he ran across the room and then jumped from the upstairs window. The officer suffered serious wounds and permanent scarring.

Held: D was convicted, because (despite not intending to cause GBH) he had intended to resist arrest and been reckless about causing GBH. (Though the conviction was overturned because the trial judge misdirected the jury that objective recklessness was sufficient.

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Murder

R v Gibbins and Proctor (1918)

The father of a seven-year-old girl, along with his partner, kept the girl separate from her half-siblings and deliberately failed to feed her. The girl died from starvation.

Held: The failure to feed the girl was enough to constitute ‘killing’ for the actus reus of murder. An omission can create liability for murder.

R v Malcherek (1981)

D stabbed his wife. She was placed on life support. After tests revealed her to be brain dead, doctors switched off the life support machine. The defence argued that switching off life support broke the chain of causation and removed the defendant’s liability.

Held: Switching off life support did not break the chain of causation. When doctors remove life support, they are not ‘killing’.

Attorney-General’s Reference (No.3 of 1994) (1997)

The defendant stabbed his pregnant girlfriend, wounding the unborn child. The child was born prematurely and then died from the injuries 121 days after birth. The defendant was acquitted of both murder and manslaughter, but the case was referred to the House of Lords by the Attorney-General.

Held: The defendant was convicted of manslaughter. As part of the ruling, the House of Lords held that a ‘reasonable creature in being’ for the purposes of murder means a person who has taken a breath independently of their mother after birth. The defendant was not convicted of murder because he lacked the required mens rea.

R v Vickers (1957)

D broke into a sweet shop. He knew the owner of the shop was an elderly woman who was deaf. When he was interrupted by the owner, he punched her repeatedly and kicked her in the head. The woman died from her injuries. The defendant was convicted at trial and appealed on the basis that he lacked the required mens rea for murder.

Held: The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. Despite not intending to kill the woman, the defendant had intended to cause grievous bodily harm. The court held that this has always been enough for the mens rea of murder.

R v Cunningham (1981)

D attacked the victim in a pub by repeatedly hitting him with a chair. The victim died from his injuries. D was convicted at trial and appealed on the basis that he did not have a high enough level of intention for the murder conviction.

Held: The House of Lords upheld his conviction on the basis that he intended to cause grievous bodily harm to the victim. However, in the ruling, Lord Davies wrote, ‘It is strange that a person can be convicted of murder if death results from, say, his intentional breaking of another’s arm, an action which, while undoubtedly involving the infliction of “really serious harm” and calling for severe punishment, would in most cases be unlikely to kill.’

DPP v Smith (1961)

D was told by a police officer to stop his car, but D drove away instead. The officer jumped onto the car and was then thrown off it and killed when D swerved the car harshly. D was convicted of murder and appealed on the basis that he did not intend to cause GBH.

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Manslaughter by loss of control

s 54 Coroners and Justice Act 2009

(1) Where a person (“D”) kills or is a party to the killing of another (“V”), D is not to be convicted of murder if—

(a) D's acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing resulted from D's loss of self-control,

(b) the loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger, and

(c) a person of D's sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to D.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), it does not matter whether or not the loss of control was sudden.

(4) Subsection (1) does not apply if, in doing or being a party to the killing, D acted in a considered desire for revenge.

s 55 Coroners and Justice Act 2009

(3) This subsection applies if D's loss of self-control was attributable to D's fear of serious violence from V against D or another identified person.

(4) This subsection applies if D's loss of self-control was attributable to a thing or things done or said (or both) which

(a) constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character, and

(b) caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.

(6) In determining whether a loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger—

(a) D's fear of serious violence is to be disregarded to the extent that it was caused by a thing which D incited to be done or said for the purpose of providing an excuse to use violence;

(b) a sense of being seriously wronged by a thing done or said is not justifiable if D incited the thing to be done or said for the purpose of providing an excuse to use violence;

R v Ahluwalia (1992)

The defendant suffered years of abuse from her husband. One night, she went to bed but couldn’t sleep. She went downstairs, got some petrol and a candle and used them to set the room on fire in which her husband was sleeping. He died. She pleaded the defence of provocation.

Held: Because provocation required a ‘sudden’ loss of control, the defence failed. However, the case contributed to a Law Commission report in 2006 that recommended changing the defence. Under the new defence of loss of control, Ahluwalia would likely have been successful in her defence.

R v Jewell (2014)

The defendant was ill, sleep-deprived and depressed. He shot the victim at point-blank range with a shotgun. He was found in his car with weapons and a survival kit. He told the jury, “I did it because I lost control. I could not control my actions. I could not think straight. My head was fucked up. It was like an injection in the head, an explosion in my head.”

Held: The defence of loss of control failed and D was convicted of murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeal said there must be a total loss of self-control: “Has D lost his ability to maintain his actions in accordance with considered judgement or has he lost normal powers of reasoning?”

R v Turner (2023)

The defendant killed his wife by stabbing her 68 times. He was convicted of murder after the trial judge refused to allow loss of control to go to the jury, on the basis that 68 stabbings was sufficient evidence that he had not lost control. D appealed.

Held: The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and ordered a retrial. It was held that a frenzied attack might provide some evidence that D had lost control, but doesn’t necessarily mean there either was or was not a loss of control.

R v Drake (2023)

Drake and another defendant stabbed a man to death. Drake gave evidence saying that he had lost control. The trial judge said this was not enough to allow the defence to go to the jury and refused to allow the jury to consider it. He was convicted and appealed.

Held: The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. D saying they lost control is not sufficient (on its own) to demonstrate loss of control, because saying “I lost control” might also be used to describe a general loss of temper.

R v Ogonowska (2023)

D was a woman who – after having previously been a victim of sexual violence – stabbed a man to death while he was sexually assaulting her. She was convicted on the basis that taking a knife to the scene removed the possibility of a defence of self-defence. On loss of control, D had explicitly said that she had not lost control of herself during the attack. D appealed her conviction.

Held: The appeal was dismissed. As part of the ruling, the Court of Appeal held that D saying they had not lost control is a “factor of significance in the overall assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence”, but is not necessarily a decisive factor.

R v Dawes (2013)

The defendant found his wife asleep on the sofa with the victim. The defendant attacked the man, who then retaliated. The defendant stabbed the victim, but argued loss of control on the grounds that he feared serious violence by the victim.

Held: The defence of loss of control failed and D was convicted of murder. The Court of Appeal held that, under s 55(3) CJA 2009, the defendant cannot rely on fear of serious violence if the defendant themselves incited the violence in the first place.

R v Doughty (1986)

The defendant was a new father whose baby son (aged 19 months) would not stop crying. D killed the child. The defendant tried to use the defence of provocation (under the old law) based on ‘things done or said’ by the baby that provoked the killing, but the trial judge refused to allow this to be put to the jury.

Held: The defence failed at first instance but the defendant’s conviction for murder was quashed because the trial judge should have allowed the ‘things done or said’ by the baby to be put to the jury as a defence.

R v Zebedee (2012)

The defendant lost control and killed his 94-year-old father, who was suffering from Alzheimer’s and repeatedly soiled himself. The defendant argued loss of control based on ‘things done or said’ by his father that caused him to lose control and kill him. The defence was put to the jury but failed. The defendant appealed.

Held: The defendant’s conviction for murder was upheld on appeal. The defence had been put to the jury, who had decided it did not meet the threshold of an ‘extremely grave character’ and a ‘justifiable sense of being seriously wronged’.

R v Clinton (2012)

D – who suffered from depression – found out that his wife was having several affairs. When she came home, she mocked him with details of what she had been doing. D’s wife also mocked him about having suicidal thoughts and told him he wasn’t brave enough to kill himself. D then killed her.

Held: The Court of Appeal held that, even though sexual infidelity is an ‘excluded matter’, the defence can still be used if sexual infidelity is just one part of a broader range of ‘things done or said’ that meet the threshold required.

R v Ibrams and Gregory (1981)

The defendants suffered a series of threats and harassment from the victim. They made a plan to attack the person who was threatening them and killed him two days later. Under the old law, they tried to use the defence of provocation.

Held: The defence failed because there had been no sudden loss of control (as required by the old law). But the defence would likely still fail under the new law, as their actions reflected a ‘considered desire for revenge’, which is an excluded matter under s 54(4) CJA 2009.

R v Rejmanski; R v Gassman (2017)

In a conjoined appeal from two defendants convicted of murder, the two defendants argued that they had been deprived of a loss of control defence by judges who refused to allow their mental disorders to be considered relevant to the standard of self-control for the purposes of loss of control manslaughter.

Held: The appeals failed. “In assessing the third component, the defendant is to be judged against the standard of a person with a normal degree, and not an abnormal degree, of tolerance and self-restraint. If a personality disorder reduced the defendant’s general capacity for tolerance or self-restraint, that would not be a relevant consideration.”

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Manslaughter by diminished responsibility

s 52 Coroners and Justice Act 2009

(1) A person who kills or is a party to the killing of another is not to be convicted of murder if D was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning which—

(a) arose from a recognised medical condition,

(b) substantially impaired D's ability to do one or more of the things mentioned in subsection (1A), and

(1A) Those things are—

(a) to understand the nature of D's conduct;

(b) to form a rational judgment;

(1B) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), an abnormality of mental functioning provides an explanation for D's conduct if it causes, or is a significant contributory factor in causing, D to carry out that conduct.

R v Byrne (1960)

The defendant suffered from sexual psychopathy. He strangled a woman to death in a youth hostel and then mutilated her body. At trial, he was convicted of murder. The defence appealed.

Held: the Court of Appeal upheld the appeal and substituted a conviction for voluntary manslaughter. The court held that “abnormality of mental functioning” means “a state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it abnormal”. In their ruling the Court of Appeal held that “substantially impaired” is not a phrase that needs further explanation to a jury. It is for the jury to decide what is “substantial”.

R v Conroy (2017)

The defendant had autism and ADHD. He lived in a residential home, where he strangled a woman with the intention of having sex with her while unconscious. The victim died.

Held: the defendant was convicted of murder and the conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal. However, the Court of Appeal did rule that autism and ADHD were recognised medical conditions that could form the basis of a diminished responsibility defence.

R v Lloyd (1967)

The defendant killed his wife during an episode of depression. There was evidence that his depression had, to some extent, impaired his ability to reason. At trial, the judge told the jury that “substantial” was a word for them to interpret themselves, but it does not mean total and does not mean trivial.

Held: on appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the judge’s direction to the jury on the meaning of “substantially impaired”.

R v Golds (2016)

The defendant killed his partner, arguing that he was in a psychotic state at the time of the killing. The defendant was convicted of murder and appealed to the Supreme Court on the basis that the trial judge had not adequately explained “substantially impaired” to the jury.

Held: the Supreme Court held that the word “substantial” does not need any further explanation, unless there is a risk a jury won’t understand it. In that case, it should be explained as “important or weighty”. But the Supreme Court maintained that the directions given in Byrne and Lloyd were still good law.

R v Dietschmann (2003)

The defendant was suffering from an adjustment disorder following the death of his aunt. He believed the victim was behaving disrespectfully towards his aunt’s memory. After drinking a lot of alcohol, he killed the victim by repeatedly kicking and stamping on him. He was convicted of murder and appealed.

Held: the House of Lords held that the defence may be available if the D is intoxicated and has a pre-existing abnormality of mental functioning. The Lords gave a model direction to juries: “Has D satisfied you that, despite the drink, his mental abnormality substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his fatal acts, or has he failed to satisfy you of that?”

R v Dowds (2012)

The defendant killed his partner by inflicting sixty knife wounds on her. The defence argued that acute voluntary intoxication amounts to a “recognised medical condition” for the purposes of diminished responsibility. He was convicted of murder and appealed.

Held: the Court of Appeal upheld his conviction. They held that voluntary intoxication in itself is not a recognised medical condition and that, if Parliament had wished for it to be so, it would have been made explicit in the statute.

R v Wood (2008)

The defendant suffered from alcohol dependence syndrome (ADS). He drank heavily, then fell asleep at his friend’s flat. He claimed he was woken by the victim trying to perform a sex act on him. The defendant killed the victim with a meat cleaver.

Held: on appeal, the Court of Appeal held that ADS is a recognised medical condition. If ADS has caused long-term damage to the defendant’s brain, or if it meant that the intoxication wasn’t voluntary, the defence of diminished responsibility is available.

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Unlawful act manslaughter

R v Franklin (1883)

The defendant threw a large box from Brighton Pier into the sea. It struck the victim, who was swimming beneath the pier. The defendant was charged with both unlawful act manslaughter and gross negligence manslaughter. The prosecution accepted that throwing the box into the sea was a civil wrong (a tort) and was not a crime.

Held: The defendant was not liable for unlawful act manslaughter. The court held unlawful act must be criminal to create liability for unlawful act manslaughter - a civil wrong (e.g. a tort or a breach of contract) is not enough.

R v Lamb (1967)

Held: D’s conviction was overturned as no assault had taken place. If there is no completed crime, there can be no liability for unlawful act manslaughter.

R v Grey (2024)

Grey was a woman who was partially blind and had cerebral palsy. She confronted an elderly cyclist who was cycling towards her on the pavement, waving and telling her to get off the pavement while cycling. At trial, no specific base offence was identified, but Grey was found guilty of unlawful act manslaughter.

Held: D’s conviction was overturned by the Court of Appeal. It was held that a base offence was essential and that the likely base offence (assault) couldn’t have been proven because of Grey’s lack of mens rea for the assault.

R v Lowe (1973)

The defendant wilfully neglected his baby son, who died as a result. The trial judge directed the jury that, as wilful neglect was a crime, it could be used as the basis of an unlawful act manslaughter. The defendant was convicted and appealed.

Held: On appeal, the conviction for unlawful act manslaughter was overturned. There must be a positive act (not an omission) to create liability for unlawful act manslaughter.

R v Church (1966)

Held: D was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter and the conviction was upheld on appeal. In the ruling, the court held that the test for the dangerous act is that “all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise… the risk of some harm, albeit not serious harm”.

R v Larkin (1943)

The defendant threatened a man with an open razor, at which point the man’s girlfriend intervened to protect him. As the girlfriend was drunk, she fell onto the open blade, which cut her throat and killed her.

Held: D was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter. Whether or not he thought the act of threatening the man was dangerous, it constituted a technical assault and the objective test of danger was met.

R v Mitchell (1983)

D punched a 72-year-old man during an argument in the queue at a Post Office. The elderly man staggered backwards and fell into an 89-year-old woman. The women was knocked over and later died of her injuries.

Held: D was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter. The fact that the dangerous unlawful act was directed against someone other than the eventual victim was irrelevant.

R v J M and S M (2012)

The two defendants started a fight with staff at a night club. During the fight, the victim (a bouncer) collapsed after suffering a ruptured renal artery. The rupture was not directly caused by an attack by either defendant, but it was considered to have likely been caused by the fight. The trial judge stopped the trial, arguing that no sober and reasonable person would recognise the risk of the ruptured artery. The prosecution appealed.

Held: The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal and convicted both defendants of unlawful act manslaughter. It does not matter whether a reasonable person would recognise the risk of the precise type of harm: sober and reasonable people would “readily have recognised that all the doormen… were at risk of some harm”.

R v Goodfellow (1986)

D set fire to the flat in which he lived to force the Council to rehouse his family. The fire spread, killing his wife, his son and another person. He was convicted of three counts of unlawful act manslaughter (with arson as the unlawful act) and appealed.

Held: The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. It did not matter that the unlawful act was a crime against property (arson); it still met the objective test for danger.

R v Dawson (1985)

The defendant (along with two others) entered a petrol station armed with a weapon and with a mask covering his face, in an attempt to rob it. The staff member raised the alarm, but then died from a heart attack. D was convicted and appealed.

Held: On appeal, the conviction for unlawful act manslaughter was quashed. Although sober and reasonable people would recognise the risk of shock or fear, they would not recognise the risk of this leading to physical harm.

R v Watson (1989)

D broke entry into the house of an 87-year-old man. When the man came to confront the defendant, D physically abused him and then left. The man died from a heart attack 90 minutes later. D was convicted and appealed.

Held: The conviction was overturned. However, in the ruling it was held that burglary could be ‘dangerous’ for the purposes of unlawful act manslaughter.

R v Williams and Davis (1992)

V was a hitch-hiker who believed Williams and Davis were trying to steal his wallet. As a result, V jumped from the car while it was travelling at 30mph. He died from head injuries. The defendants were charged with unlawful act manslaughter.

Held: The defendants were acquitted. The victim’s act in jumping from the car broke the chain of causation, meaning that the alleged unlawful act (the theft) did not cause the death.

R v Kennedy (2007)

D prepared a heroin injection and handed it to the victim. The victim injected himself with the heroin, handed back the syringe and later died. Kennedy was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter (with s 23 OAPA – administering a noxious substance – as the unlawful act) and the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. The case was referred to the House of Lords.

Held: The House of Lords overturned the conviction. They held that D had not ‘administered a noxious substance’ and that the victim self-injecting meant that D’s actions had not ‘caused the death’.

DPP v Newbury and Jones (1976)

The two defendants pushed a piece of paving stone from a railway bridge as a train approached. The stone hit the train guard and killed him. They were convicted of unlawful act manslaughter (with reckless criminal damage as the unlawful act) and appealed.

Held: The House of Lords upheld their conviction. That they didn’t recognise any risk of harm was irrelevant. The defendants had the mens rea for reckless criminal damage.

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Gross negligence manslaughter

R v Adomako (1995)

D was a hospital anaesthetist. During an eye operation, D failed to notice that an oxygen supply tube had become detached. The patient died from a heart attack caused by the lack of oxygen. Expert witnesses at the trial described the failure to notice the tube as ‘abysmal’.

Held: D was convicted and the conviction was upheld on appeal in the House of Lords. Adomako became the key authority on GNM. In the judgement, Lord Mackay wrote, “the ordinary principles of the law of negligence apply to ascertain whether or not the defendant has been in breach of a duty of care towards the victim.”

R v Edwards (2001)

The defendants were parents who allowed their 7-year-old daughter and her friend to play near a railway line. They told the two children that they would warn of any oncoming trains. The two children were killed by a train the defendants failed to notice.

Held: under the ordinary rules of negligence, the defendants owed a duty of care to both children (through being parents and through setting in motion a chain of dangerous events) and breached that duty.

R v Finlay (2001)

The defendant was a scout leader who took a group of children mountaineering on Mount Snowdon. Safety procedures were not all in place and a 10-year-old child fell and died.

Held: as a scout leader (under the ordinary rules of negligence), the defendant owed a duty of care to the victim.

n.b. the defendant was not convicted because the breach was not considered serious enough to be grossly negligent.

R v Wacker (2002)

D was a lorry driver involved in a conspiracy to bring 60 people into the UK illegally. There was an air vent allowing air into the back of the lorry, but D closed it for several hours to avoid detection. 58 of the people in the lorry died from suffocation. D argued that, under the rules of civil law, the victims would not have been able to sue because they were complicit in an unlawful activity.

Held: D was convicted and the conviction was upheld on appeal. The Court of Appeal held that the joint unlawful activity was not relevant to a criminal conviction for GNM.

R v Evans (2009)

D provided heroin to her half-sister, who self-injected the heroin and then became ill. D failed to summon help and put the victim to bed, hoping she would recover, but the victim died.

Held: D was convicted of gross negligence manslaughter and the conviction was upheld on appeal. D owed a duty of care to V through having set in motion a chain of dangerous events.

R v Singh (1999)

D was the landlord of a property in which the victim lived as a tenant. D had left his son in charge of managing the property, and their failure to maintain a faulty gas fire led to the victim dying from carbon monoxide poisoning.

Held: D was convicted of gross negligence manslaughter and the conviction was upheld on appeal. In the ruling, it was confirmed that ‘the circumstances must be such that a reasonably prudent person would have foreseen a serious and obvious risk not merely of injury, even serious injury, but of death’.

R v Kuddus (2019)

D was the owner and chef in a fast-food restaurant and takeaway. The victim – a 15-year-old girl – ordered food and informed the restaurant of her nut allergy, but D himself was not informed. The victim died after eating the food that included peanuts.

Held: D was convicted but the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction. ‘The defendant’s breach of duty must give rise to (1) a risk of death, that was (2) obvious and (3) serious. These are objective facts, which are not dependent on the state of mind or knowledge of the defendant.’

R v Rose (2017)

D was an optician who performed a routine examination on V to determine whether V needed glasses. D carried out a statutory test for signs of serious illness, but accidentally reviewed the images from the previous year instead of the test she had just performed. V died five months later from hydrocephalus. D was convicted of GNM and appealed on the basis that the risk of death was not obvious because she had not seen the images that would have made it so.

Held: D’s conviction was quashed because the risk must be reasonably foreseeable from the position of the breach, not from the position D would have been in if they hadn’t breached their duty.

R v Rudling (2016)

D was a GP who received a call from a parent concerned about her 12-year-old son’s health. The boy was experiencing severe vomiting, incontinence and discolouration of his skin. The GP decided not to examine the boy, who then died from Addison’s disease (a very rare illness). It was accepted that most GPs would not be expected to recognise the condition from the description of its symptoms alone.

Held: the case against D was dismissed as no case to answer by the trial judge and the Court of Appeal agreed. ‘An obvious risk is a present risk which is clear and unambiguous, not one which might become apparent on further investigation.’

R v Bateman (1925)

D was a doctor who had cared for a woman during childbirth. During the birth, part of the victim’s womb came away and D did not refer her to hospital for five days. The victim died as a result. D was convicted and appealed.

Held: the House of Lords held that D had not been grossly negligent. ‘The facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury, the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving of punishment.’

R v Misra (2005)

The two defendants were senior doctors who failed to notice an infection in a patient after a knee operation. The infection spread and V died. The defendants were convicted and appealed on the basis that the ‘gross negligence’ element of the offence is not clearly defined and that this is in breach of Article 7 ECHR, which says a defendant shouldn’t be convicted of an offence that wasn’t criminal at the time it was committed.

Held: the Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and rejected the argument about Article 7 ECHR. ‘The question for the jury is not whether the defendant’s negligence was gross, and whether, additionally, it was a crime, but whether his behaviour was grossly negligent and consequently criminal. This is not a question of law, but one of fact.’